The specific problem that the paper explores is the relaying of packets in a simple butterfly network. Despite its apparent simplicity, this problem enables to illustrate key features of situations of uncertain knowledge that arise in networks. The paper presents two impossibility facts and one possibility fact, in the latter of which a scheme that enables optimal coordination given persisting imperfection in knowledge is introduced.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the impact of bounded or inconsistent information on the performance of a simple relay network.
In a network, nodes typically implement distributed protocols for routing, relaying, discovery, leader election, congestion control, and other operations. Generally, the nodes have delayed and incomplete information about the state of the network. It is therefore natural to question the impact of this incomplete information on the performance of the protocols.
A first line of inquiry considers delays and lack of synchrony among the nodes. A representative result is that a distributed Bellman-Ford protocol converges to the shortest paths if messages are eventually delivered between nodes, assuming that the network topology does not change [2] . More general results concern the convergence of parallel and distributed algorithms [3] .
A second tread of investigation addresses impossibility theorems for distributed applications. An early result is the impossibility of two generals to agree with certainty when messages they exchange have some probability of not being delivered [5] , [7] . Another well-known result is the Byzantine general problem where, using oral messages, loyal generals cannot agree on whether to attack or retreat if at least one third of the generals are traitors [6] , [8] .
In game theory, a related formulation of the imperfection of information has received considerable attention after the publication of Rubinstein's electronic mail paper [9] . In that paper, two friends exchange lossy messages to decide whether to go out for coffee. One friend knows that the weather is bad and tries to agree with his friend that they should postpone their going out. Even after a large number of messages, they may end up not making the correct joint decisions.
This paper examines similar situations where different nodes should coordinate their actions to prevent a bad outcome. However, because of imperfection of knowledge, the nodes may choose the wrong actions. The paper focuses on a simple example where only one of two nodes in a network should relay a packet to prevent a collision. The difficulty is that the nodes do not know perfectly the two probabilities of success nor what the other node knows. Even after exchanging an arbitrarily large number of 'link state messages' the nodes may end up making the same decision of either relaying the packet or not. The goal of the paper is to explore protocols that avoid such pitfalls and are robust with respect to imperfect knowledge.
The first part of the paper focuses on the impact of bounded knowledge. The second part studies the situations where the nodes have inconsistent beliefs but they know it as a common knowledge.
Many other protocol design problems face similar difficulties, such as leader election, routing, and forwarding. The authors hope that the paper will increase awareness of this issue.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider the network shown in Figure respectively. If node A forwards the packet, it gets to node D with probability p A . Otherwise, the link from A to D is in deep fade and no energy reaches node D. The situation is similar for node B, but with probability p B instead of p A . The assumption is that if the packet reaches D both from A and from B, then the two copies of the packet collide and D does not get the packet correctly. The question of interest is how A and B should choose the probabilities a and b to maximize the probability π(a, b) that D gets the packet. (One can think of a more general scenario where A and B receive the packet from S with some probability or where simultaneous forwarding may not yield packet loss. It does not change the conclusions of the paper.) From the description of the system, one finds π(a, b) is given by
If the nodes A and B both know p := (p A , p B ) and share that knowledge as a common fact, they can choose the values a * and b * such that
We call this situation perfect knowledge. Thus, both nodes know p and know that both know it. The knowledge is common and exact: the nodes know the precise state of the network and they both know that precise knowledge is common to both. It is easy to verify that
with the corresponding optimal performance
Roughly speaking, if none of links AD and BD is good (p A and p B are small), both nodes should relay. Otherwise, only the node with the best link should relay. However, the success probabilities p of the links change over time and the nodes can observe only their local link directly. Thus, in practice, the nodes never have a perfect knowledge. One practical approach is for the nodes to exchange 'link state' messages to improve their knowledge. A key aspect of the formulation is to model precisely the knowledge of the nodes A and B and to understand how this knowledge affects their decisions and the resulting performance measures of the network.
The nodes A and B communicate somehow to increase their knowledge about the network. Their communication path is not explicitly shown in the figure. The nodes exchange lossy messages and we examine what they know after n messages. We call that knowledge 'Level-n knowledge. ' Initially, before they exchange messages, we assume that A knows p A and B knows p B . This is Level-0 knowledge. Now synchronously each node sends a message to the other. Node A sends a message to B saying 'I know p A .' At the same time, B sends a message to A saying 'I know p B .' (The synchronous assumption is relaxed later.) When it gets that message, B knows p B , and that A knows p A . However, B is not sure that A knows that B knows p A . Similarly, A knows p A , and that B knows p B but A is not sure that B knows that A knows p B . This is level-1 knowledge. After the next exchange of messages, the nodes have Level-2 knowledge, and so on. Note that Level-n knowledge is defined when the nodes receive the n messages, even though the nodes assume that these messages can get lost. These levels of knowledge can be formalized as follows.
A knows p A and that B knows p B .' Inductively, define K A (n + 1) to mean 'A knows p A and K B (n)' and similarly K B (n + 1) to mean 'B knows p B and K A (n)' for n ≥ 0. The interpretation is that the (n + 1) th message from A to B carries K A (n), so that upon receiving it node B knows p B and K A (n), which is K B (n + 1). The situation is similar with A and B interchanged.
Of course, the n th message from A may get lost, in which case the knowledge of B remains what it was previously. The discussion on this case is postponed to Section IV One expects that, as they exchange more and more messages, the nodes' knowledge approaches perfect knowledge. However, it turns out that the values of the relaying probabilities a n and b n that the nodes choose with Level-n knowledge may result in a probability of success π(a n , b n ) that does not approach π * .
III. ANALYSIS
To study the impact of imperfect knowledge on node decisions, we explore the strategies of the two nodes A and B under different levels of knowledge.
A. Level-0
Consider first the case of Level-0 knowledge where node A knows p A and node B knows p B but not more than that. Since node A does not know anything about p B and what B knows, it is sensible for that node to choose a value of its relaying probability a that guarantees a good probability of success, no matter what p B is and what the choice of node B is. That is, node A chooses the reliable value a 0 of a given by
Similarly, node B chooses the value b 0 of b given by
From (1), one finds that
Consequently, the maximizing value a 0 of min b,pB π(a, b) is given by
Similarly,
The resulting probability of success is
We find that
Note that
Therefore the network is guaranteed not to lose more than half of the performance when relays have Level-0 knowledge.
B. Level-1
After exchanging the first messages, the nodes reach Level-1 knowledge K A (1) and K B (1). That is, A has learned that B knows K B (0) and, consequently, that B will base the choice of b on K B (0). That is A considers that B will choose b = b 0 . Accordingly, A chooses the value a = a 1 such that
Consequently the maximizing value a 1 is given by
For certain set of p, multiple choices are possible for a 1 and/or b 1 , which in turn correspond to different values of the probability of success π(a 1 , b 1 ). The worst case is a possible cost of the lack of knowledge. Define π 1 := min π(a 1 , b 1 ).
One finds
Consequently,
which shows that the imperfect knowledge can reduce the probability of success to zero.
C. Level-n and Failure of Convergence
After exchanging (n + 1) th messages, and reaching Level-(n + 1) knowledge, node A chooses a n+1 as the best response to its belief about the node B's decision, and similarly for B. That is,
It is easy to verify that a 2k = a 0 , b 2k = b 0 and a 2k+1 = a 1 ,
Since a 0 = a 1 and b 0 = b 1 , one sees that the solution does not converge as the level of knowledge increases. In general, for
That is, constructing deeper knowledge via lossy message exchange does not approach perfect knowledge and the network performance remains bounded away from optimality. Thus, even if the nodes exchange n messages successfully, the possibility that a message gets lost suffices to prevent the nodes from making optimal decisions. Figure 3 summarizes the results of this section.
More generally, the node may have only imprecise Level-0 knowledge. For example, node A knows p belongs to a set Z, or
2 . The imprecise knowledge situation is widespread because of imperfection of observation or estimation on state of the nature. As a result, the nodes know only a rough range containing the true state.
. The reliable solution for a at Level 0 is 
Fig . 3 . Evolution of the network performance (a) p ∈ [0,
IV. KNOWLEDGE WITH MESSAGE LOSS
In the previous section, we implicitly assumed the nodes A and B synchronously increase their knowledge level despite the possibility that messages might get lost. Figure 4 illustrates a more realistic scenario: At some time t 0 , nodes A and B have knowledge K A (n) and K B (n) respectively. At time t 0 both nodes send messages to each other. Node A's message gets lost and node B does not receive it, whereas node B's message reaches node A. At time t 1 , node A reaches an additional level of knowledge while node B's knowledge does not change. At the next time step, node B's knowledge level jumps by 2, to level n + 2, whereas node A's knowledge does not change and remains at level n + 1, and so on. Note that the nodes' knowledge level may lose synchronization when a message is lost. However, their knowledge level gap is never more than one because one node's next knowledge level depends on the other node's current knowledge level.
Thus, at any given time t, the network performance can be either π(a n+1 , b n ) or π(a n , b n ) or π(a n , b n+1 ).
Consequently, in addition to the lossless case, it suffices to consider π(a 1 , b 0 ) and π(a 0 , b 1 ). From (III-A) and (6), one finds
otherwise.
By symmetry, π(a 0 , b 1 ) is similarly found. This completes the claim that the relays cannot reach optimal coordination via lossy message exchange no matter how high a knowledge level they obtain.
We conclude this section with a summarizing fact:
Fact 1: A distributed system cannot reach the optimal coordination by building higher level of bounded knowledge via lossy message exchange.
V. ACHIEVING OPTIMAL COORDINATION
The previous section shows that the lack of certainty in message delivery prevents the nodes from coordinating their t0 t1 t2 t3 Fig. 4 . Assumption of synchronous message exchange is relaxed: Knowledge evolution when a message from A to B is lost at time t 0 .
actions optimaly. This failure of optimal coordination persists regardless of the level of knowledge. This observation is similar to the conclusions of the electronic mail game [9] which led many researchers to study the continuity of belief structure. Hopefully, the model of this paper shows the relevance of such considerations to network protocols. The practical question is to how find a mechanism that achieves the optimal coordination based on local knowledge K A (n) or K B (n) among distributed agents. The preceding analysis shows that the set of parameters of the system determines the evolution of the performance as n increases. For instance, the analysis shows that if p :
2 , then a n = b n = 1 is optimal for n ≥ 0. Also, once node A knows K A (n) for some n ≥ 1, it knows that π = π * regardless of the level of knowledge that node B has reached. The same is true for node B. That is, if p ∈ [0, 2 , the nodes know that Level-1 knowledge suffices to enable optimal decisions.
However, the solution does not converge for p / ∈ [0,
In that case, the nodes know that basing their decisions on Leveln knowledge does not lead to optimal coordination. With this observation, they can choose to deviate from the myopic maxmin strategy and follow instead the following mechanism:
OPTIMAL COORDINATION-ACHIEVING SCHEME Upon receiving message KB(0) from B, A updates its knowledge and obtains KA(1). However node A does not send KA(1) to node B. Instead, node A keeps sending KA(0) to node B. Similarly, node B sends KB(0) to node A, even though node B actually knows KB(1).
Once node
2 . In that case, the relaying solution based on K A (1) is known to be optimal. If p / ∈ [0,
2 , node A knows that gaining a higher level of knowledge results in oscillations that can in turn yield a zero probability of success. Accordingly, node A does not follow the myopic max-min algorithm based on an additional level of knowledge. Instead, it assumes that K A (1) is the global information. At that time, although node B still has knowledge K B (0), the network performance is guaranteed to be at least half the optimal level, because of the Level-0 result. If node B has knowledge K B (1), then both nodes A and B agree to the optimal coordination. Since the message is lossy, node A keeps sending K A (0), so that node B eventually reaches knowledge K B (1) with probability one.
It is worth mentioning some differences with the Electronic Mail Game result where no finite sequence of message exchanges can result in optimal coordination. First, in the current problem, the payoff is defined as the max-min performance rather than the von Neumann-Morgenstern form. Second, there is no negative payoff biasing the players' decision. Third, the different message exchange protocol is pivotal because it does not assume an automatic acknowledgment that is one of the main causes making the coordination impossible as pointed out in [4] .
Fact 2:
A distributed system with lossy message exchange can asymptotically reach the optimal coordination by restricting the information propagation.
VI. COMMON KNOWLEDGE ABOUT INCONSISTENT BELIEFS
Information is not knowledge but belief when it does not guarantee the inclusion of the true state. Suppose node i has a belief about p's possible values: B i := {p ∈ Z i }. A different node may have a different belief. One key observation is however, i does think B i as a knowledge rather than a belief since otherwise it would modify Z i to make it include broader values. By exchanging B i , distributed nodes can build common knowledge about beliefs. Unless Z i and Z j conflict, they cannot distinguish knowledge from belief. We say they reach the common knowledge state about consistent beliefs, or simply a common belief. When they discover Z i and Z j conflict, we say they reach the common knowledge state about inconsistent beliefs. It is of a practical challenge to make a strategic decision in a coordination game while players have common knowledge about inconsistent beliefs. [1] explained that the distributed players with the same prior cannot agree to disagree. We study the game where the prior is not defined.
This situation frequently occurs in many practical games. For an example, consider a double tennis match game in which two players see each other and need to decide who returns a ball. Due to different experience, two may have inconsistent views on the game. Further they know it as a common knowledge. It is likely that they try to hit or leave the ball simultaneously, failing to coordinate.
Similarly, due to imperfection or randomness of observation, two relays in relaying network may obtain different beliefs about the network state. After information exchange step, they build common knowledge about inconsistent beliefs.
Upon facing inconsistency, an issue about trust arises -trust about information but not about the intent of the information source. A trust is a meta information of the coordination game how the distributed information should be interpretated. It is seldom explicitly stated in the game description. When the way of trust is specified however, it helps the nodes to reach the conciliation, if required, from inconsistency.
In a coordination game, it is obvious that the nodes with common belief cannot outperform those with common knowledge. However, it is not clear if consistent belief will be always better than inconsistent belief.
A. Distrust
It is called distrust (in others) when the node trusts only its belief. Then nodes will fail to reach the coordination. Suppose Z A = {(0.9, 0.2)} and Z B = {(0.2, 0.9)}. Under distrust, knowing B's best response, A's best response is a = 1. Similarly B's best response is b = 1. As a result, both know (a, b) = (1, 1) will be played. Note that the true network state p can be neither of Z A nor Z B , but can be something else. Interestingly, it is not the case the incoordination from distrust always underperforms; depending on the true network state p, the failure of coordination may prove to be good.
An example may suffice to convince readers. Let p true = (0.4, 0.4), Z = Z A = {(0.9, 0.2)} and Z B = {(0.2, 0.9)}. The coordination solution is (a, b) = (1, 0) based on Z, whose choice is to be explained shortly. Then the coordination performance based on Z is π(a * (Z), b * (Z)) = 0.4 while the incoordination performance is π(a * (Z A ), b * (Z B )) = 0.48. If the game is such that the price of the failure of coordination is significant however, players may elect to rely on an external conciliation rule. This rule should be performance ignorant; since they cannot agree on the range of true network state, there is no common measure to compare the performance of one rule to other. A simplest way is to adopt a single belief from the node whose lexicographical order is the highest. Then each node's decision will be based on that single belief.
B. Partial Trust
In some situation the nature of the game suggests that a node give up some trust in its initial belief and take some beliefs from others. The partial trust may arise in various forms. We discuss a few cases: Locality trust, Meet type trust and Join type trust.
Here the trust is a way of constructing a new common belief from the distributed and inconsistent information. The choice of a trust form should be mandated across the players at the time of the game design, if any conciliation is to be needed.
Define z k i to be the set of possible values for p k that node i initially believes. z i i is a belief about its local link and z k i , k = i about its foreign link. Then
1) Locality trust: It is possible that link i can be best known to node i. That is, each node has trust in everyone's local link belief but not foreign link. In this case, the node with common knowledge about inconsistent beliefs are willing to agree on a common belief that is constructed with most trusting elements. is (a, b) = (1, 1) and a coordinated solution with local/meet type conciliation is (a, b) = (1, 0). At p true , the distrust solution outperforms coordinated solution after conciliation.
We conclude this section with the a summarizing fact:
Fact 3: Neither belief consistency nor a common knowledge about beliefs is sufficient to achieve an optimal coordination in a distributed system.
VII. CONCLUSION
The distributed system with a common goal often faces the issue of independent decision with limited knowledge where the price of coordination failure can be significant. In this paper we focused to understand the impact of information uncertainties. In particular we studied bounded knowledge about other's knowledge and common knowledge about inconsistent beliefs.
To make the problem down-to-earth, we adopted a simple butterfly relaying network which has been a popular platform in communication networking area. In the first problem, we showed that two relay nodes with bounded level of knowledge about other's knowledge cannot reach the state of global coordination regardless the depth of the level. However, we also provided a scheme in which the network can asymptotically achieve the optimal coordination via the intentional restriction of knowledge propagation. Finally we showed that belief consistency or the state of common knowledge about beliefs in general is not a sufficient condition for optimal coordination. , with respect to a. Minimum is the lower boundary. Its maximum is obtained at a 0
When drawn with respect to a, the result of minimization is the lower boundary of the area spanned by two linear curves p A a and p A a(1 − 2p is regarded as the base state.) Irrespectively, the guaranteed performance is always lower in imprecise knowledge.
When this knowledge is built up in a higher level, the solution and the performance do not converge in general.
